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Abstract 
 
This paper examines demand for union membership amongst young workers in Britain, 
Canada and the United States.  The paper benchmarks youth demands for collective 
representation against those of adult workers and finds that a large and significant 
representation gap exists in all three countries.  Using a model of representation advanced by 
Farber (1982) and Riddell (1993) we find that a majority of the union density differential 
between young and adult workers is due to supply-side constraints rather than a lower desire 
for unionisation on the part of the young.  This finding lends credence to two conjectures 
made in the paper; the first is that tastes for collective representation do not differ among 
workers (either by nationality or by age) and second that union representation can be 
fruitfully modelled as an experience good.  The experience good properties of union 
membership explain the persistence of union density differentials amongst youth and adults 
both over time and across countries.  
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 1.  Introduction  
 
It is often asserted by many commentators that trade unions are outmoded institutions, unable 
to reach a new generation of workers imbued with individualist values that are at odds with 
the solidaristic ethos underpinning unionism.  They are quick to attribute declines in union 
membership, observable across most of the Western industrialised world, to young people’s 
reduced desire for union membership.  It is certainly the case that the unionisation rate for 
young workers (those aged 15-24) is less than half than that of adult workers (those aged 
25+).  This youth-adult union density differential appears almost everywhere but is 
particularly striking in Anglo-Saxon economies where similar systems of workplace and 
statutory recognition prevail.  In particular, Britain, Canada, and the United States all display 
youth unionisation rates that are two and a half times lower than those of adult workers.  
However, to establish that the union movement’s future is at risk because young people are 
turning their backs on unions, one has to establish two things.  First, that the youth-adult 
unionisation differential is growing and, secondly, that this is due to a reduced desire for 
membership on the part of the young.  In this paper, we present evidence on both these 
points.  We find that the youth-adult differential rose in Britain during the 1990s, but not in 
Canada or the United States.  Furthermore, we show that the desire for union membership is 
actually higher among young workers than it is among adult workers.  We go on to show how 
lower observed unionisation among young workers can co-exist with increased desire for 
membership due to the nature of union membership, which can be conceived of as an 
experience good, and by the costs and benefits of joining a union for young workers relative 
to those faced by older workers.  
In our paper we assume – in the spirit of neo-classical economic theory – that 
employees of any age have the same underlying preferences.1  What distinguishes their 
labour market behaviour are the differing constraints they face.  In applying the similar-taste 
view of consumer theory to the question of youth-adult union density differentials, we arrive 
at a rather intriguing implication:  that preferences for union representation at the workplace 
should be the same across all age groups.  Given the assumption of homogeneous 
preferences, the divergence in the probability of being unionised can therefore be explained 
by either greater frustrated demand for unionisation amongst younger workers (under-
                                                 
1 This view was most forcefully argued by Stigler and Becker (1977) who asserted that:  ‘Tastes neither change 
capriciously nor differ importantly between people.  On this interpretation…the economist continues to search 
for differences in [constraints] to explain differences or changes in behaviour.” 
2 
representation) or greater numbers of dissatisfied older-aged unionised workers (over-
representation).  Put simply, if workers have the same underlying preferences, but large 
differentials exist in the likelihood of being unionised, then at present one  group of workers 
‘isn’t getting what they want.’  
Three testable propositions emerge from the queuing and experience good model of 
unionisation described below.  The first proposition is that it should be more costly for 
younger employees to gain representation at the workplace.  This is so because of differing 
levels of knowledge surrounding the process of union organizing and information concerning 
the potential costs and benefits of union membership.  In a similar context, it should be 
relatively more costly for workers already employed in unionised environments to opt out of 
membership since representation is usually granted at the level of the workplace and 
employees not wishing to pay union dues still receive representation.  Since, on average, the 
probability of being unionised peaks when workers are middle-aged, there may be a 
significant segment of older-aged workers who may be unionised, but who would otherwise 
desire to work in a non-unionised environment.2  
The second proposition asserts that if informational impediments and opposition to 
union organising are greater for younger workers, then a majority of the density differential 
between youths and adults can be ascribed to supply side constraints and not to differences in 
demand.  
Our last proposition argues that if tastes are indeed similar among workers, then 
estimating an equilibrium union density rate – given data on actual union density and voting 
intentions of union and non-union workers by age group – should yield a probability of being 
unionised that is statistically similar for both older and younger workers. 
The paper begins in Section 2 with a description of Farber and Krueger’s (1993) 
queuing model of union representation and how it can be applied to adult-youth union density 
different ials.  We then show it can be extended with the use of the experience good model of 
union membership.  In Section 3 the paper describes adult-youth union density differentials in 
Britain, Canada and the United States throughout the 1990s, and we then provide information 
on the data sources.  In Section 4 a description of the empirical model used and the specific 
propositions to be tested are provided.  In Section 5 the empirical results are presented and 
the paper ends with a summary of the findings.  
                                                 
2 Though this group of frustrated union members may be as large as the group of frustrated young workers 
desiring membership, it is a question that can only be answered by an appeal to the empirical evidence.  
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2.  What is Union Membership? 
 
A useful framework for analyzing union density differentials and testing propositions 
regarding the effects of preferences and constraints in determining union membership is the 
queuing model of union representation.  This model is also known as the supply and demand 
framework of collective representation (Farber, 1982; Farber and Krueger, 1993 and Riddell, 
1993).  In this model some workers may prefer to be unionised, but for various reasons, they 
are not.  The reasons for remaining non-union, in spite of a willingness to be unionised, are 
multifaceted but are ultimately reducible to the fact that workplaces are costly to organize.  
However, once organized, they are more likely to remain unionised into the future.  This 
produces two sets of union membership costs and probabilities:  (i) the cost and probability of 
entering a unionised environment and (ii) the cost and probability of organizing a non-
unionised workplace.  These two concepts will be formalized below and then applied to the 
question of youth-adult union density differentials. 
 
2.1  The queuing model applied to youth-adult union membership differentials 
 
Following Riddell (1993), let zi represent the difference between the expected utility of any 
job (union or non-union) for individual i.  The utility loss or gain, which is unobserved, is 
dependent on a host of variables (Xi) such as differences in working conditions, job security 
and the wage differential between otherwise similar union and non-union jobs. 
 
(1) zi = X i b + e i 
 
If we let Di be a dichotomous variable taking on the value 1 for individuals who would prefer 
to belong to a union, and hence prefer unionisation, and zero for those who do not, then, 
 
(2) Prob (Di = 1) = Prob (z>0) = Prob (Ui >- X ib). 
 
Now let Ui=1 for individuals who are unionised and Ui=0 for non-union workers.  Assuming 
that labour markets are in equilibrium implies that individuals have sorted themselves into the 
jobs of their choice.  If this is so, then it would be the case that 
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(3) Prob (Ui =1) = Prob (z>0) = Prob (Ui >- X ib). 
 
This equation implies that the factors determining the demand for unionisation could be 
estimated using information on union status alone. 
However, as discussed above there are several reasons why unions do not necessarily 
represent all individuals who prefer to be in a union job.  One of the most obvious reasons 
relates to the costs of organising a union for an individual worker in systems where there 
exists a Wagner Act model of representation.  If employers actively oppose union organizing 
attempts in environments where statutory recognition is the typical route by which workers 
gain collective representation, then from an employee’s perspective, the costs of unionising 
may outweigh the benefits.  Thus, even if a majority of current workers in a workplace prefer 
unionisation, they may remain non-unionised as a result of organising costs.3 
Following Farber (2001) we can denote the cost of organizing an unorganized 
workplace by Co and the cost of taking a job in an already unionised establishment by Ce so 
that Co > Ce.  A worker will therefore desire a unionised job when the perceived benefits V of 
unionisation outweigh the costs Vi > Ce.  However, they will be willing to invest in 
organizing activity only when Vi > Co.  Since the actions of management determine whether a 
workplace will be easy or difficult to organize, the observable stock of union jobs is a 
function of more than just desired membership on the part of workers, since there will be 
workers who would like to be union members but for whom the cost of organizing is too high 
and therefore are unwilling to invest in organizing a union themselves.  Formally these are 
workers for whom Ce< Vi < Co and the result is that there will be more workers who desire a 
union job than there are existing union jobs, resulting in frustrated demand for unionisation 
and an implicit queue.  
The queuing model has important implications for estimating models of differing 
union status probabilities between different segments of workers.  Since a worker will only 
be unionised if the worker prefers union employment to nonunion employment and a union 
employer hires the worker or the worker is part of a successful organizing drive, then one can 
imagine that certain workers have an easier time being hired into existing union jobs or have 
lower costs associated with union organizing. 
In what follows, we argue that the cost of union membership is higher for young 
workers than for older aged workers.  This is partially due to the traditional reasons cited in 
                                                 
3 Equally there may be workers who are unionised but are dissatisfied with membership and therefore unlikely 
to be members in the coming period. 
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the literature (e.g. unions tend to favour the organizing of older workers and thus pour greater 
resources in organizing older aged workers) but more importantly because of the nature of 
union representation itself.  It turns out that if modeled from a consumer theory perspective – 
as any other product or service would be modeled – union representation has properties of 
what in standard industrial economic and marketing textbooks is known as an experience 
good.  The experience good properties of union membership serve to raise both the cost of 
organising a union yoC  and the cost of entering a unionised environment 
y
eC  for young 
workers as compared to older workers with similar tastes for unionisation.  This leads to a 
situation where two workers (one young and one older) with equal perceived benefits of 
unionisation oi
y
i VV =  nevertheless displaying differing union status probabilities 
)1(Pr)1(Pr =>= yi
o
i UobUob  simply because 
o
o
y
o CC >  or 
o
e
y
e CC > .  
So why is it that young workers find it more costly to organize or be hired into a 
unionised environment? For an answer, we begin with a more precise definition of experience 
goods and their properties.  
 
2.2  Extending the queuing model:  union membership as an experience good 
 
Diamond and Freeman (2001) have recently identified the incumbency effect as one of the 
strongest determinants of whether or not workers develop favorable attitudes towards unions. 
The authors hypothesize that workers tend to ‘like the workplaces that they have’ as long as 
they meet some minimum threshold of acceptability in terms of working conditions and pay. 
Their model helps explain the cross-sectional difference in attitudes among workers towards 
unions at union and non-union work sites.  
Another way of accounting for the Diamond and Freeman (2001) finding is to view 
union representation (or lack of representation) as an experience good.  Experience goods are 
products or services whose characteristics and utility can only be fully assessed after 
‘purchase’.4 Studies of consumer satisfaction suggest that consumers are more likely to ‘learn 
to like what they buy’ than ‘buy what they like’, especially if they purchase an experience-
good.  This is due to what social psychologists term ‘attribution error’ and can occur even 
when consumers carefully weigh their options before purchase.  For example, if Bob thinks 
                                                 
4 By way of contrast, a search good, is one in which upon fairly simple inspection prior to actual purchase (e.g. 
clothing which can be tried on), quality and potential utility are easily assessed. 
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brands X, Y, and Z are equally attractive before purchase, his positive judgment of Y, if 
selected, will rise after purchase merely because of its selection. 
 
2.3  Implications of the experience good model of union membership 
 
Three implications with pertinence to youth-adult union density differentials fall out of the 
experience good model of union membership.  These implications pertain to (1) 
informational asymmetries; (2) uncertainty and risk; and (3) attribution errors.  These 
properties are of use in explaining union density differentials between groups and also the 
persistence of non-union enclaves at the regional, occupational and industry-wide level 
(Bryson and Gomez, 2001).  Experience good properties exert their effect on observed age 
differentials in union membership by either lowering the perceived advantages of being a 
union member Vi or by raising the costs of becoming a union member, either by entering a 
unionised workplace Ce or  by organizing to become unionised Co.  
 
2.3.1  Informational asymmetries 
 
Theories drawn from the field of industrial economics imply that the amount of information 
supplied to consumers should be greater for experience goods than for search goods, because 
this is where information is most necessary, and hence, garners its highest returns. 
Advertising outlays, however, do not conform to the expectations of the model.  In one of the 
earliest studies, Porter (1974) found that low-priced, frequently purchased ‘search goods’ 
receive more than twice the advertising outlays than do experience goods.  This apparent 
anomaly can be explained by the fact that consumers are more likely to be informed about 
experience good product-quality through word-of-mouth referrals, rather than through paid 
advertising (Kotler, 2000).  
A formal model of why word-of-mouth referrals are the preferred channel by which to 
disseminate information about experience goods is still largely unexplored.5 However, the 
implication of word-of mouth referrals for union membership is relatively straightforward.  
As a service provided to workers, the value of union representation can only be judged after 
purchase.  As such, personal referrals and social interactions are required in order to discern 
the potential benefits of working in a unionised environment.  For young workers, the needed 
                                                 
5 Montgomery (1991) has a model applied to the labour market, as to why personal referrals are more likely to 
lead to a job offer than are otherwise comparable referrals. 
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social interactions and work experience are lacking, so that although many young workers 
may have a latent desire for union representation, it may not be sufficiently large to overcome 
managerial opposition or lack of knowledge concerning the effects of union membership. 
These informational asymmetries, in turn, generate higher perceived costs of  organizing or 
becoming a union member for young workers as compared to otherwise similar but older-
aged workers.6 
 
2.3.2  Uncertainty and risk 
 
There is greater uncertainty associated with the purchase of experience goods than 
equivalently priced search goods since one cannot discern quality before purchase. 
Uncertainty here is to be distinguished from ‘risk’.  Risk perceptions have to do with 
tolerances for mean-variance tradeoffs, whereas uncertainty refers to the absence of 
knowledge surrounding the expected value of a ‘project’ (in this case the payoff gained from 
becoming a union member and gaining access to union services) and the volatility associated 
with those expectations.  
The degree of perceived uncertainty attached to the ‘purchase’ of union membership 
may be a function of a worker’s age.  As exposure to union and non-union environments 
increases with age, older workers are better able to select workplaces that fit their appropriate 
tolerances for risk and insurance, and also to gauge the effects of unionisation if required to 
vote for representation.  Thus, two workers with the same underlying risk preferences may 
differ in their union status simply because of the uncertainty regarding the payoffs from 
joining a unionised environment, or voting for unionisation at the workplace.  These 
uncertainties serve, once again, to raise the costs of organizing or choosing a unionised 
workplace in which to be employed. 
 
2.3.3  Attribution error 
 
Studies of consumer behavior demonstrate that most individuals do not learn to buy what 
they like after random sampling, but instead learn to like what they buy without trial and 
error purchasing.  This is especially true of experience goods.  Experience goods often 
display higher than expected ‘post-purchase’ satisfaction, which is not consistent with the 
                                                 
6 Similar in this context simp ly means workers with the same desire for membership and costs refer to such 
things as fear of job loss, fear of strike action, and managerial opposition. 
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rational model of consumer behavior (Greer, 1992).  Such behavior is often termed 
attribution error, in that people rationalize their behavior after undertaking it, rather than 
engaging in a clear and rational pre-purchase survey of options.  
 Applying this logic to the persistence of low union density enclaves, one finds that 
historical or path dependent labour market processes have an underlying micro-economic 
foundation.  Being ‘born’ into a non-union workplace – and assuming that the non-union 
environment meets some minimum level of acceptability in terms of pay and working 
conditions – makes the chances of remaining non-unionised much higher.  Non-union 
representation is one type of working arrangement (or one kind of experience good).  This 
non-union status remains even if workers display a desire for representation, since the 
organization of a union is not costless and workers will simply rationalize their non-union 
status by claiming that they are ‘better off’ and ‘happier’ working in a non-union 
environment.  Since most young workers today are employed in ‘greenfield sites’ with little 
or no union presence (see Figure 2), it is likely that the attribution error effect is at work, thus 
explaining why higher levels of frustrated demand for unionisation can co-exist with little or 
no organizing activity. 
 
 
3.  Unions and Young Workers in the 1990s:  Britain, Canada, and the US 
 
3.1  Union density by age group 
 
Table 1 shows the percentage of union members in the labour force by age group for the 
1990s in Britain, Canada, and the United States.  It shows a steady decline in union density 
across adult age groups in all three countries, with the largest decline in absolute percentage 
point terms occurring in Britain.  In Canada there was a slight increase in union density 
amongst youth in 2000 as compared to 1995, but still lower than the figure estimated in 1990.  
In all three countries, adults were more likely to be unionised than youth. 
In Figure 1, the adult-youth density differential for each country is plotted against 
three time periods taken in the 1990s.  Interestingly, three distinct patterns emerge.  In 
Britain, the differential has steadily increased, whereas in the US the differential has steadily 
declined.  In Canada the differential rose between 1990 and 1995, only to fall back to its 1990 
level in 2000.  
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3.2  Data on desired union membership 
 
Our analysis of preferences for unionisation in Canada and the United States utilises data 
drawn from the Lipset and Meltz (1997) survey of Canadian and American worker attitudes 
toward work, social policy and unions.  The survey generated a representative sample of 
Canadian and American workers.  The purpose of the survey was to probe the views of the 
population in general and of employees in particular toward work, institutions and social 
policy.  More specifically, information was provided on general values of workers, including 
views on individualism versus group or communitarian orientation, the role of governments, 
confidence in institutions, and perceptions of labour market outcomes such as whether they 
expected to be laid off in the near future.  
The Angus Reid Group, one of Canada’s leading public opinion survey firms, 
administered the survey through telephone calls – which averaged 20-26 minutes per 
respondent – in June and early July 1996.  The survey was conducted in French in the 
province of Quebec and in Spanish in the US to obtain a representative sample of 
respondents.  In all cases, the results in this paper are drawn from interviews with randomly 
generated samples of working age adults in Canada and the US. 
Both union and non-union respondents were asked a variety of questions about their 
attitudes towards unions and specifically whether they would prefer to belong to a union.  
Preferences for union membership differed across age groups, with youths aged 15-24 more 
interested in belonging to a union than adults aged 25-64 in Canada (57 versus 48 percent) 
while in the US adults had a slightly higher preference for unionisation (47 versus 53 
percent).  Our measure of preferences for unionisation is based on the response to the survey 
question “All things considered, if you had a choice, would you personally prefer to belong 
to/remain in a labour union or not?”   
For Britain, the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA) was employed since the 1998 
BSA contains two data items which relate to the demand for unionisation.  The first measure 
is based on hypothetical questions asked of employees in non-unionised and unionised 
workplaces.  Employees in unionised workplaces are asked:  ‘Do you think that your 
workplace would be a better or worse place to work in if there was no trade union/staff 
association, or would it make no difference?’ Employees in non-unionised workplaces are 
asked whether their workplace would be a better or worse place to work in if there was a 
union or staff association.  In both cases, responses are coded along an ordinal scale from ‘a 
lot better’ to ‘a lot worse’.  We combined the two measures so that, for each employee, we 
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have an indicator of whether or not the employee thinks the workplace is, or would be, a 
better place to work in where a union is present.  Where employees say the presence of a 
union makes, or would make, the workplace ‘a lot better’ or ‘a little better’ to work in, this is 
treated as a desire for unionisation.   
The second measure of desire for unionisation in BSA 1998 is a question asked of 
employees in workplaces without a union or staff association recognized by the employer for 
pay bargaining.  It asks:  ‘If there were a trade union at your workplace, how likely or 
unlikely do you think you would be to join it?’  Answers range from ‘very likely’ to ‘not at 
all likely’.   
 
 
4.  The Empirical Model 
 
The queuing model presented in Section 2 depicted a more realistic portrait of the nature of 
union membership, where the true or ‘total’ demand for union jobs is defined by the fraction 
of workers who are either union members and who would remain so if a vote were held, or if 
non-union, who would vote for unionisation at their workplace.  The supply of union jobs 
relative to demand is measured by the fraction of workers who are union members compared 
to those demanding union representation.  If there were no queues for union jobs, the fraction 
would be one.  To the extent that there are non-union workers who prefer union 
representation, this fraction will be less than one.  The fraction of individuals in the non-
union sector Ui=0 who would vote for unionisation at their workplace Di=1 therefore 
constitutes a measure of “frustrated demand” (or an inverse measure of relative supply).  
These two components can be more formally specified.  Following Farber and 
Krueger (1993), the probability that a worker is unionised is given by  
 
(4) Prob(U=1) = Prob (D=1) – Prob (D=1, U=0). 
 
The first term on the left hand side is the desire for unionisation among union and non-union 
workers and therefore represents the demand for union representation.  The second term is 
what Riddell (1993) terms frustrated demand.  The probability that a worker is unionised, 
therefore, is equal to the probability that she desires union representation minus the 
probability that the worker desires union representation but is not working in a unionised job.  
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4.1  The supply-demand framework applied to youth and adult workers  
 
The demand and supply framework is useful in evaluating competing explanations for the 
difference in unionisation rates among different groups or categories of workers.7 Taking the 
case of youth-adult differences in the probability of being unionised, an equation analogous 
to (4) can be specified, 
 
(5) Prob (Uo=1) – Prob (Uy=1) = [Prob (Do=1) – Prob (Dy=1)]  
– [Prob (Do=1,Uo=0) - Prob (Dy=1,Uy=0)]  
 
where the subscript the subscripts o and y refer to older and younger workers respectively.  
The term in the first brackets measures the difference in demand for unionisation between 
older and younger workers.  The term in the second brackets measures differences in the 
relative supply of unionisation.  The second term can also be thought of as a direct measure 
of frustrated demand for unionisation.  Based on (5) we can now test our first proposition 
(formalized below), by comparing levels of frustrated demand across all three countries. 
 
Proposition 1a:  Given a higher rate of unionisation amongst older workers and our 
assumption of similar preferences for union representation, there should be more frustrated 
demand (less relative supply) for unionisation amongst younger workers.  That is, there are 
relatively more young non-union workers who would prefer to be unionised but who are not 
currently being represented.  
 
Proposition 1b:  Given a higher rate of unionisation amongst older workers and our 
assumption of similar preferences for union representation, there should be relatively more 
frustrated older aged union members.  That is, there are relatively more unionised workers 
aged 25+ who would prefer not to be unionised but who are currently being represented.  
 
If we take the difference in the probability of being unionised for both youth (15-24) and 
adults (25-64) in Britain, Canada and the US in and around 1996 (the time of the Canada-US 
Angus Reid survey and also the 1998 BSA survey) – e.g. the term on the left hand side of (5) 
– and decompose it into differences associated with the desire for unionisation (demand) 
                                                 
7 Recently, Gomez, Lipset and Meltz (2001) have employed this approach in an analysis of Canadian and 
American union differentials Bryson and Gomez (2001) have done the same for Britain. 
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versus differences in relative supply (frustrated demand) then we can provide an estimate for 
the first and second terms on the right hand side of (5).  Once again, based on (5) our second 
testable proposition can now be formalized: 
 
Proposition 2:  Given our assumption of greater informational barriers, fewer union 
organizing activities and greater constraints on young workers desiring representation, if one 
were to decompose the difference in union density between the young (15-24) and adult 
workers (25+) according to supply and demand factors, a majority of the density differential 
can be ascribed to supply side constraints. 
 
Clearly, if we find evidence of a supply side constraint for young workers, then the idea of a 
hypothetical level of union density that would be more or less equal across both groups in all 
three countries emerges.  As a consequence our third proposition is the following: 
 
Proposition 3:  If one were to construct a potential equilibrium rate of unionisation – given 
data on actual union density and voting intentions of union and non-union workers combined 
with similar preferences and greater frustrated demand for unionisation amongst older 
workers – then the probability of being unionised should be statistically similar across age 
groups and countries. 
 
Such a proposition can easily be tested by constructing a hypothetical union density rate 
based on the following equation: 
 
(6)  (U*=1) = [Prob(U=1)· Prob (D=1 êU=1) ] + [Prob (U=0) · (D=1 êU=0)] 
 
where U* is potential union demand as function of the proportion of existing union members 
who would prefer to remain unionised (first term in brackets) plus the proportion of non-
union workers who would vote to become unionised (the second term in brackets). 
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5.  Results 
 
5.1  Is frustrated demand for unionisation higher amongst young workers? 
 
In accounting for the union density gap, an important factor does seem to be greater frustrated 
demand for unionisation on the part of youth in all three countries (see Row 5 Table 2).  Our 
results also confirm that by far the greatest difference between young and adult workers is the 
greater supply of unionisation for adult workers.  This can been seen by examining union 
status  conditional on a worker’s desire for union membership (see row 6 Table 2).  That is, an 
older worker in all three countries who desires union representation has a far greater chance 
(133 percent higher in Britain and Canada, and 121 percent higher in the US) of being 
unionised than a younger worker who desires the same representation.  
This may appear like a rather tautological finding since most young workers are 
employed disproportionately in ‘young’ workplaces or in private services, where the chance 
of having a recognized union present is very low, thus leaving no scope for youngsters to 
become unionised.  We agree with this response, but it is important to note that this was not 
always the case.  If one looks at British data from the BSA (the only data set with a consistent 
question going back to 1983) we find that in the early 1990s roughly 50 percent of youths 
were employed in establishments with a recognized union in place.  By 1998 that figure had 
fallen to 32 percent, a drop of nearly 20 percent in less than a decade (see Figure 2).  This is 
indicative of a shortfall in the supply of union jobs for young workers that one would be hard 
pressed to categorize as an equilibrium response to lower demand.  The fall in the supply of 
union jobs is more indicative of a systematic policy by employers to forestall the union 
option for young workers, leading to a shortfall in knowledge of where to find union jobs and 
how to organize unions in new workplaces. 
 
5.2  Is the youth-adult union density differential a supply-side phenomenon? 
 
In order to assess the relative importance of demand and supply factors, the gap in union 
density between adults and youths can be decomposed using (5) for all three countries.  The 
difference in union density between adults and youths in Britain, Canada and the US was 19, 
23 and 11 percentage points respectfully (Table 2 column 3 row 1).  Using our estimate of Pr 
(D=1êU=0), then Pr (D=1,U=0) equals 18, 23 and 06 (Table 2 column 3 row 5) for all three 
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countries.  Using Britain as an example of how to read the tables, 18 points of the 19-point 
gap in union density between young and old workers in Britain is attributable to less relative 
supply.  The remaining difference (1 point) is due to greater demand for unionisation by adult 
workers.  Therefore, a full 94 percent of the adult-youth difference in union density is 
accounted for by supply-side factors, while only 6 percent is attributable to demand side 
differences.  This result is in line with the Canadian data where a full 100 percent of the 
differential is attributable to supply side constraints.  In the US the figures are lower, with just 
over half (55 percent) of the total 11 percentage point differential in union density attributable 
to demand side factors. 
 
5.3  Are equilibrium union density rates the same for both adults and youth? 
 
In terms of equilibrium or potential representation U* a striking pattern emerges:  potential 
levels of union membership are very similar across all three countries for both youth and 
adult workers (Table 2 row 2).  Levels all hover around the 50 percent mark for both groups 
with youth having slightly higher propensities to unionize in Britain and Canada than adults 
while the pattern reversing itself in the US.  These results are suggestive that while union 
organizers may have a harder time overcoming managerial resistance to collective bargaining 
than in the past, workers themselves have a latent desire for representation.  The problem, of 
course, occurs at the workplace level.  Under statutory recognition, unions need to convince a 
majority of workers in each workplace of the need for representation and this desire has to be 
matched by employees with a willingness to expend time and effort into organising and 
voting for unionisation. 8 
 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
In this paper we presented the experience good model of union membership in combination 
with an assumption borrowed from an often cited but controversial paper, in which consumer 
                                                 
8 These results are slightly at odds with previous estimates by both Riddell and Farber and Krueger that pointed 
to greater demand for unionisation in Canada than the US and a lower base level of support in both countries. 
The reason for the upward bias in Canada is also partly attributable to the fact that previous studies were 
working with separate Canada-US data sets and differently worded questions.  Whereas the US question in the 
Riddell and Farber and Krueger studies was similar to our own survey, the Canadian question was slightly more 
ambiguous. 
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preferences were treated “…as stable over time and similar among people”(Stigler and 
Becker, 1977:76).  Based on this interpretation of consumer preferences and the empirical 
application to a queuing model of union membership, we were able to answer the question of 
why the union density rate for young workers is less than half of that of older aged workers.  
In the paper we produced three testable propositions, and in each case our propositions were 
confirmed.  We found the following: 
 
· there is greater frustrated demand for unionisation amongst young workers (substantial 
under-representation) as compared to older workers in Britain, Canada and the US 
· a full 94, 100 and 55 percent of the gap in union density between youths and adults at the 
time of the surveys in Britain, Canada and the US respectively could be accounted for by 
unsatisfied demand for unionisation (supply-side constraints).  That is, an older aged 
worker desiring union representation had a far greater chance (two and a half times more 
likely in Britain and Canada and twice as likely in the US) of being unionised than a 
younger worker who also desired union representation. 
· potential levels of union density U* are higher than presently observed in all three 
countries and that the levels are very similar in all three countries (e.g. approximately 50 
percent of the workforce could potentially be unionised). 
 
We consider these results as direct confirmation that workers, at least in terms of 
preferences for representation at the workplace, are similar across age groups and borders and 
conform to the ‘naïve’ model of consumer choice.  In all three countries close to half of the 
working age population desires representation.  In Britain and Canada roughly 60 percent of 
adult workers desiring representation are covered whereas amongst youth only 26 percent 
receive the same representation (in the US it was 51 and 23 percent respectively).  
We interpret these results as providing powerful, albeit indirect, confirmation that facets 
intrinsically related to the nature of union membership pose greater obstacles to the gaining 
of union membership for young workers than similar older-aged workers.  Conceptualizing 
union membership as an experience good may hold the key to understanding why preferences 
for unionisation are not being realized for young workers.  As a subject of future research it 
may be useful to construct models where the ability to become unionised is more formally 
presented as an individual ‘search cost’, which requires some knowledge that has to be 
obtained (perhaps knowledge about whom to contact or how to circumvent  employer 
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obstacles) in order for worker preferences (frustrated demand) to become realized.  With 
some workers displaying the same desire for membership but lower search costs than 
otherwise similar workers, one can formalize and explain the persistence of non-union 
enclaves at the socio-demographic, regional, occupational and industry-wide level. 
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Table 1:  Percentage of Union Members in the Labour Force by Age Group:  1990-2000 
 
  
Canada 
 
 
Age group 
 
1990 
% 
 
1995 
% 
 
2000 
% 
 
1. All employees 35.6 31.1 30.4 
2. Adult (25+) 39.5 37.2 35.5 
3. Youth (16-24) 17.5 10.7 12.6 
4. [Adult-Youth] 22.0 26.5 22.9 
  
United States 
 
 
Age group 
 
 
1990 
% 
 
1995 
% 
 
2000 
% 
1. All employees 15.8 14.1 13.5 
2. Adult (25+) 19.0 16.8 15.9 
3. Youth (16-24) 5.8 5.2 5.0 
4. [Adult-Youth] 13.2 11.0 10.9 
  
Britain 
 
 
Age group 
 
 
1990 
% 
 
1995 
% 
 
2000 
% 
1. All employees 43.0 36.0 33.0 
2. Adult (25+) 48.0 43.0 37.0 
3. Youth (16-24) 34.0 27.0 19.0 
4. [Adult-Youth] 12.0 16.0 18.0 
    
 
Source:  Information on union density rates for Canada was obtained from the Labour Force Survey, Statistics 
Canada and Perspectives on Labour and Income, Statistics Canada.  Information on union density rates for the 
US was obtained from Bureau of Labour Statistics.  Information on union density for Britain was obtained from 
the British Social Attitudes survey, various annual waves.  British Data for 2000 contains the latest figures 
available which were for 1998. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
Table 2:  Relative Supply and Demand For Union Membership Across Age Groups: 
1996 
 
 
Canada 
 
 
 
Youth 
 
Adult [Adult-Youth] 
1. U=1 .13 .36 .23 
2. U*=1  .57 .48 -.06 
3. D=1¦ U=1 .73 .67 -.06 
4. D=1¦ U=0 .50 .32 -.18 
5. D=1, U=0 .44 .21 -.23 
6. U=1¦ D=1 .27 .63 .36 
 
United States 
 
 
 
Youth 
 
Adult [Adult-Youth] 
1. U=1 .05 .16 .11 
2. U*=1  .47 .53 .06 
3. D=1¦ U=1 .67 .73 .06 
4. D=1¦ U=0 .42 .40 -.02 
5. D=1, U=0 .39 .33 -.06 
6. U=1¦ D=1 .23 .51 .28 
 
Britain 
 
 
 
Youth 
 
Adult  [Adult-Youth] 
1. U=1 .16 .35 .19 
2. U*=1  .50 .46 -.04 
3. D=1¦ U=1 .50 .62 .12 
4. D=1¦ U=0 .51 .37 -.14 
5. D=1, U=0 .42 .24 -.18 
6. U=1¦ D=1 .26 .62 .36 
 
Source:  Information for Canada and the US was obtained from the 1996 Lipset-Meltz Angus Reid Survey of 
union members.  Information on union density for Britain was obtained from the British Social Attitudes survey, 
1998.  
 
Pr (U=1):  The probability that a worker is a union member.  
 
Pr(U*=1):  Hypothetical level of union density or the probability that a worker desires and receives union 
representation.  This is the sum of the probability that a worker is a union member and desires to retain union 
membership plus the probability that worker desires union representation but is not employed on a union job 
(union membership plus frustrated demand).  Formally, this is Pr (D=1 êU=1)*Pr(U=1) + Pr (D=1, U=0). 
 
Pr (D=1 ê U=1):  The probability that a union worker demands union representation.  
 
Pr (D=1 ê U=0):  The probability that a non-union worker demands union representation.  
 
Pr(D=1,U=0):  The probability that a worker demands union representation but is not employed on a 
union job (frustrated demand).  Computed as Pr (D=1 êU=0)*Pr(U=0).  
 
Pr (U=1 êD=1):  The probability of being unionised conditional on the desire to be unionised.  This 
represents the eas e of obtaining a union job given that a worker desires a union job.  Riddell (1993) interprets 
this as a measure of relative supply. 
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Figure 1:  Adult-Youth Union Density Differentials in the 1990s 
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Source:  Row 4 Table 1 for each country. 
 
 
Figure 2:  Percentage of Youth Employed in Establishments with a Recognized Union: 
Britain 1990s 
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Information on union density for Britain was obtained from the British Social Attitudes survey, various annual 
waves. 
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